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Abstract
In this paper, we study fast training of adversarially ro-
bust models. From the analyses of the state-of-the-art de-
fense method, i.e., the multi-step adversarial training [34],
we hypothesize that the gradient magnitude links to the
model robustness. Motivated by this, we propose to per-
turb both the image and the label during training, which we
call Bilateral Adversarial Training (BAT). To generate the
adversarial label, we derive an closed-form heuristic solu-
tion. To generate the adversarial image, we use one-step
targeted attack with the target label being the most con-
fusing class. In the experiment, we first show that random
start and the most confusing target attack effectively pre-
vent the label leaking and gradient masking problem. Then
coupled with the adversarial label part, our model signif-
icantly improves the state-of-the-art results. For example,
against PGD100 white-box attack with cross-entropy loss,
on CIFAR10, we achieve 63.7% versus 47.2%; on SVHN,
we achieve 59.1% versus 42.1%. At last, the experiment
on the very (computationally) challenging ImageNet dataset
further demonstrates the effectiveness of our fast method.
1. Introduction
Deep learning has achieved great success in many vi-
sual recognition tasks in computer vision. However, deep
neural networks are extremely vulnerable to adversarial at-
tacks [51]. Specifically, the network is easily fooled to
make wrong predictions in the face of adversarial exam-
ples, which are adversarially manipulated images by adding
small and imperceptible perturbations. This poses a great
danger to deploying real-world machine learning systems.
Therefore, training an adversarially robust model is of great
value towards commercialized AI technology.
In the recent years, many approaches have been pro-
posed to defend against adversarial examples. As demon-
strated by [1], multi-step adversarial training [34] is cur-
rently the best defense method. Specifically, adversarial
training solves a minimax (saddle point) problem. The inner
maximization generates adversarial examples by multi-step
projected gradient descent (PGD), which are then used in
the outer minimization to optimize the network parameters.
To understand the working mechanism of the multi-step
adversarial training, we first perform two diagnostic exper-
iments on CIFAR10. The first experiment is to test a seem-
ingly correct assumption: using stronger adversarial attacks
during training will lead to more robust models. To this end,
we compare two adversarially trained models, which only
differ in the hyper-parameters of the inner maximization:
1) the default setting in [34], denoted by PGD7-2, where
the number of iterations is 7 and the step size is 2 pixels; 2)
a model trained using a weaker attack, denoted by PGD2-8,
where the number of iteration is 2 and the step size is 8 pix-
els. We observe that PGD2-8 is largely as robust as PGD7-2
under different white-box attacks, even though PGD2-8 at-
tack is weaker than PGD7-2 attack. This result leads us to
hypothesize that robustness may not be achieved by simply
fitting sufficient adversarial examples during training, and
to re-consider if there is more essential ingredients that di-
rectly relate to network robustness. With this in mind, we
conduct the second experiment where we compare the gra-
dient magnitude of both undefended models and adversari-
ally trained models. We observe that the gradient magnitude
of adversarially trained models is much smaller than that of
the undefended models. Intuitively speaking, if the gradient
(with respect to input images) becomes extremely small, the
gradient-based adversarial attacks are likely to fail no matter
how many iterations are used. This inspires us that gradient
magnitude may directly link to model robustness.
Based on the above observations, in order to achieve ad-
versarial robustness, we would like a model to satisfy the
following two conditions: 1) low loss (zero-order condi-
tion); 2) small gradient magnitude (first-order condition).
To this end, in this paper, we propose a formulation to
achieve these two conditions by perturbing both input im-
ages and labels during training, which we call Bilateral Ad-
versarial Training (BAT). As for generating the adversarial
image, we adopt one-step PGD which speeds up the train-
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
10
71
6v
2 
 [c
s.C
V]
  1
 A
ug
 20
19
ing by multiple times compared to [34]. In order to avoid
the troublesome label leaking and gradient masking prob-
lem often induced by one-step PGD [29, 52], we do the fol-
lowing: 1) using targeted attack with the target label being
the most confusing class; 2) adding random uniform noise
to the original image as initialization, i.e., random start as
in [34]. As for generating the adversarial label, we derive a
formula to perturb the groundtruth label (in the form of one-
hot vector) based on the gradient with respect to input label
(i.e., the negative logarithm probability). As a special case,
this solution reduces to label smoothing when the gradient
of non-groundtruth classes are equal.
In the experiment, we first empirically demonstrate that
random start and the MC targeted attack are very effec-
tive at avoiding label leaking and gradient masking prob-
lem. The model trained by using these two techniques
alone can achieve similar robustness as multi-step adver-
sarially trained models in [34]. Next, after adding adver-
sarial label part, our model significantly improves the state-
of-the-art results in [34]. In order for rigorous robustness
evaluation, we use the strong white-box attacks such as
PGD100 and PGD1000 with both cross-entropy loss and
margin-based loss. For example, against PGD100 under
cross-entropy loss, on CIFAR10, we achieve 63.7% ver-
sus 47.2%; on SVHN, we achieve 59.1% versus 42.1%. At
last, we apply our fast method to the very challenging Ima-
geNet dataset. Our model is successfully trained using only
8 GPUs, compared with 53 GPUs [26] and 128 GPUs [56].
Compared with the recent state-of-the-art [56], our model is
better on clean images and against non-targeted attacks, but
worse against randomly targeted attacks, using an order-of-
magnitude less computational resources.
In summary, our contribution is threefold. First, we em-
pirically show that small gradient magnitude may improve
the adversarial robustness. Second, we propose a fast ad-
versarial training method called BAT, which perturbs both
the image and the label. Third, our method significantly
improves the state-of-the-art results on several datasets.
2. Related Work
2.1. Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial examples have long been studied in machine
learning [12, 23, 3, 4]. In the time of modern deep learning,
[51] first pointed out that CNNs are vulnerable to adver-
sarial examples, and proposed a box-constrained L-BFGS
method to compute them. Later on, [19] proposed the fast
gradient sign method (FGSM) to efficiently generate adver-
sarial examples. FGSM was then extended to an iterative
version in [28], which showed that adversarial examples can
exist in the physical world. In [38], the authors proposed
DeepFool to compute the adversarial perturbations, and de-
fine and quantify the robustness of classifiers. In [7], the
famous CW attack was proposed, which used the margin-
based loss, and applied change-of-variables to remove the
constraint. In spite of being very slow, CW attack is cur-
rently one of the strongest attacks. Later [9] modified the
loss function in [7] by applying elastic net regularization.
There are some works devoted to improving the trans-
ferability of adversarial examples, which leads to stronger
black-box attacks. [33] proposed to compute the adversar-
ial perturbation by attacking an ensemble of networks si-
multaneously, and demonstrated improved transferability.
In [40], the authors assumed a scenario where the attack-
ers have access to the prediction results of a few examples.
They then trained a substitute/surrogate model based on the
limited number of examples, and generate adversarial ex-
amples using the substitute model. [15] demonstrated that
momentum-based iterative attacks achieve better transfer-
ability. There are some works proposing zeroth-order at-
tacks, i.e., using the logit to generate the attacks [53, 10].
Besides, [5] proposed the boundary attack, which is based
on the final model decision, instead of the gradient or logit.
In addition to image classification, adversarial examples
were also studied in many other tasks, including object de-
tection [55], semantic segmentation [55, 37], speech recog-
nition [11], image captioning [8], deep reinforcement learn-
ing [24, 42]. Besides the additive perturbation model, [17]
studied how to generate adversarial examples under rotation
and translation. [18] studied physically adversarial example
in the context of detecting stop sign in real world. Another
interesting topic is given by [2], where the authors synthe-
sized robust adversarial examples in 3D.
2.2. Adversarial Defenses
In recent years, many methods have been proposed to
defend against adversarial examples. One line of research
is on detecting adversarial examples, such as [36, 35]. But
later [6] showed that their CW attack is able to bypass most
detection methods. Another line of research tries to break
the special structure in adversarial perturbation by random
or non-differentiable operations [54, 20, 49, 46, 31, 43, 32].
Recently, [1] showed that many existing defense methods
relied on gradient masking, which leads to a false sense of
robustness against adversarial attacks. Besides, gradient-
based regularization [25, 45] and nearest neighbor [16] have
been demonstrated to improve robustness.
Adversarial training [19, 29, 52, 34, 48, 44, 56, 58] is
currently the best defense method against adversarial at-
tacks. [29] first scaled up adversarial training to ImageNet
dataset, where the authors used one-step least likely tar-
geted attack to generate adversarial examples during train-
ing. Later in [52], the authors pointed out that such adver-
sarially trained models suffer from gradient masking, and
proposed ensemble adversarial training, which augmented
the training data with perturbations computed from a set of
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held-out models. [34] demonstrated that multi-step adver-
sarial training is very effective at achieving robustness, and
also managed to avoid the gradient masking problem. Ac-
cording to [1], this is currently the best defense method.
3. Motivation
In this section, we empirically analyze two aspects of the
multi-step adversarial training method in [34]: 1) if more it-
erations in the inner maximization improves the robustness,
and 2) the gradient magnitude of both undefended models
and adversarially trained models. The experiments are con-
ducted on CIFAR10. Based on the analyses, we hypothesize
that making the loss surface locally flat (i.e., small local gra-
dient magnitude) helps achieve better robustness. The pro-
posed algorithm will then be given in the next section.
3.1. Background
We first give a short description of the adversarial train-
ing method in [34]. This method achieves the currently
best adversarial robustness according to [1]. Specifically,
it solves the following saddle point (minimax) problem
min
θ
{E(x,y)∼D[ max
x′∈Sx
L(x′, y; θ)]}. (1)
Here (x, y) denotes the original data point, x′ denotes the
adversarially perturbed image, L(·) denotes the loss func-
tion, and x denotes the perturbation budget. The feasible
region Sx is defined as 1
Sx = {z | z ∈ B(x, x) ∩ [−1.0, 1.0]n}, (2)
where B(x, x),{z | ‖z− x‖∞ ≤ x} denotes the `∞-ball
with center x and radius x. In the following, for the sake of
notational simplicity, without loss of generality, we present
the formulation based on a single sample. The outer mini-
mization is minimizing the cross-entropy loss as in the stan-
dard classification. The inner maximization corresponds to
the adversarial attack. In order to better explore the solution
in B(x, x), [34] uses random start before taking a number
of PGD steps, i.e.,
x0 ∼ B(x, x), (3)
xt+1 = ΠSx
(
xt + x · sign
(∇xL(xt, y; θ))). (4)
The original image x is at first randomly (uniform) per-
turbed to some point x0 in B(x, x) as in (3), and then goes
through several PGD steps as in (4). The ΠSx(·) operator
projects the input into the feasible region Sx.
3.2. Analyses
Do more iterations help? We first examine if more iter-
ations in inner maximization help improve the robustness.
1In implementation, we rescale all images with pixel values in [-1, 1].
Acc.(%) clean FGSM PGD2-8 PGD7-2 PGD20-2 PGD100-2
PGD7-2 88.0 57.0 53.0 51.2 47.6 47.2
PGD2-8 88.2 56.9 53.2 50.5 46.7 46.2
Table 1: Comparison between the model in [34] (top) and
an adversarially trained model using a weaker attack during
training (bottom). They achieve similar robustness.
undefended adversarially trained
all correct wrong all correct wrong
min 3.0e-32 3.0e-32 264.1 2.6e-26 2.6e-26 0.2
mean 395.0 23.6 7.4e3 3.8 0.4 28.9
max 4.5e4 7.0e3 4.5e4 236.2 85.9 236.2
Table 2: The minimal, average, and maximal value of gra-
dient magnitude of the test images on CIFAR10. Overall
Adversarially trained models have much smaller gradient
magnitude than undefended models. All models are trained
using the same regularization, epoch, learning rate, etc.
To this end, we compare two adversarially trained models
with different hyper-parameters for generating the adver-
sarial examples during training. The first one is the default
in [34], denoted by PGD7-2, which uses 7 steps of PGD,
and step size is 2.0. The second one is a seemingly weaker
variant, denoted by PGD2-8, meaning only 2 steps of PGD
are used and step size is 8.0. As in [34], the perturbation
budget is 8.0 in training and evaluation, and random start is
used. From Table 1, we see that PGD2-8 performs roughly
the same as PGD7-2, against PGD attacks with different
steps (strength). This result leads us to hypothesize that us-
ing stronger attacks during training may not necessarily lead
to more robust models.
Gradient magnitude of adversarially trained models.
Next we examine the gradient magnitude of the undefended
models and adversarially trained models. We consider three
collections of all test images in CIFAR10, and for each col-
lection we compute the minimal, average, and maximal of
gradient magnitude, i.e., ‖∇xL(x, y; θ)‖22. The three col-
lections are: 1) entire images, denoted by “all”, 2) cor-
rectly predicted images, denoted by “correct”, 3) wrongly
predicted images, denoted by “wrong”. The numbers are
shown in Table 2. First we see that for any collection, the
gradient magnitude of undefended model is much larger
than that of adversarially trained model. Also, for each
model, the gradient magnitude of correctly predicted im-
ages is much smaller than that of wrongly predicted images.
3.3. Hypothesis
From the above analyses, we hypothesize that small gra-
dient magnitude directly links to the adversarial robust-
ness. Intuitively speaking, if the loss surface is locally “flat”
around the data points, the model is hard to attack, no mat-
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ter how many steps are used. This hypothesis is aligned
with [32] where they call it local Lipschitz. Note that there
are papers [22, 14] studying the possible relationship be-
tween the flatness of loss surface and the generalization of
the model. In this paper, we simply use gradient magnitude
to measure the “flatness”. A rigorous treatment is beyond
the scope of the current paper and left as future work.
A straightforward idea to reduce the gradient magnitude
is to augment the loss function with some form of gradi-
ent regularization during training, e.g., [45, 25]. However,
the key problem of this idea is that training requires the
computation of second-order derivatives, which becomes
extremely slow and expensive for large-scale networks.
4. Formulation
In this section, in order to improve the adversarial ro-
bustness, we propose Bilateral Adversarial Training (BAT),
which simultaneously perturbs both the image and the label
during adversarial training.
We first approximately relate the general adversarial
training framework to small gradient magnitude. Let
x, x′ denote the original and the slightly perturbed im-
age, and y, y′ denote the original and the slightly perturbed
groundtruth (in the form of a probability distribution lying
in the probability simplex). Let L(·) denote the loss func-
tion. The first-order Taylor expansion of the loss is
L(x′, y′; θ) ≈L(x, y; θ)
+∇xL(x, y; θ) · (x′ − x)
+∇yL(x, y; θ) · (y′ − y).
(5)
We use the perturbation budget constraint in `∞-norm, i.e.,
‖x′ − x‖∞ ≤ x, ‖y′ − y‖∞ ≤ y. (6)
By Holder’s inequality, from (5) we can approximately have
the upper bound
L(x′, y′; θ) ≤L(x, y; θ)
+ x‖∇xL(x, y; θ)‖1
+ y‖∇yL(x, y; θ)‖1.
(7)
Intuitively speaking, adversarial training, by minimiz-
ing L(x′, y′; θ), translates to 1) minimizing L(x, y; θ) and
2) minimizing the gradient magnitude ‖∇xL(x, y; θ)‖1 and
‖∇yL(x, y; θ)‖1. The second point explains the results in
Table 2. Note that the first point makes the network pre-
dict the correct class, and the second point makes it difficult
to generate adversarial examples for gradient-based attacks,
because the gradient magnitude becomes very small.
The above formulation does not specify how to gener-
ate x′, y′. Mathematically, the optimization problem can be
written as
max
x′∈Sx,y′∈Sy
L(x′, y′; θ). (8)
Here Sx is defined by (2), and Sy is defined as
Sy = {z | z ∈ B(y, y), z ≥ 0,
∑
izi = 1}. (9)
The final formulation for adversarial training is as follows
min
θ
[
max
x′∈Sx,y′∈Sy
L(x′, y′; θ)
]
, (10)
where (x, y)∼D. Our simple strategy to solve (10) is to
decompose it into two separate sub-problems, and optimize
over x′ or y′ conditioned on the other respectively. After ob-
taining x′, y′, we use them in place of the original x, y as the
training data points and optimize over θ. In other words, the
training batch only contains adversarially perturbed images.
In the next two subsections, we will describe the solution to
each sub-problem respectively.
4.1. Generating Adversarial Labels
We first study how to compute the adversarial label y′
given the original data point x, y. We need to solve
max
y′∈Sy
L(x, y′; θ). (11)
Here the original groundtruth y is a one-hot vector, i.e.,
yc=1 and yk=0, k 6=c. We use k to denote the class index
and c to denote the groundtruth class. The most straightfor-
ward idea is to use the one-step PGD
y′ = ΠSy
(
y + α∇yL(x, y; θ)
)
, (12)
∇ykL(x, y; θ) = − log(pk). (13)
Here the ΠSy (·) operator projects the input into the feasible
region Sy . Basically it ensures that the adversarial label y′
is 1) in B(y, y) and 2) in the probability simplex. Next we
propose a heuristic solution to achieve both. In the follow-
ing, we will use some short notations.
vk = ∇ykL(x, y; θ), vMC = min
k 6=c
vk, vLL = max
k 6=c
vk.
Here “MC” (most confusing) corresponds to the non-
grountruth class with the highest probability, and “LL”
(least likely) corresponds to the non-grountruth class with
the lowest probability. The idea is that we decrease yc
from 1 to 1− y , and distribute y to other non-groundtruth
classes. The share for each class is based on their respective
gradient ∇ykL(x, y; θ), while the share for the MC class
(i.e., y′MC) is set to be very small. This way, we can obtain
y′k =
y
n− 1 ·
vk − vMC + γ∑
k 6=c vk
n−1 − vMC + γ
, k 6= c. (14)
Here γ is a very small value, e.g., 0.01. Please refer to the
supplementary material for another heuristic solution and
the comparison. It is easy to see that if the gradient of
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non-groundtruth classes are equal, the second multiplicative
term becomes 1 and we then obtain
y′k =
y
n− 1 , k 6= c. (15)
This is exactly the label smoothing [50]. In other words,
label smoothing can be thought of as an adversarial pertur-
bation of the groundtruth label.
Note that y controls the perturbation budget of y. We
are interested in finding the largest y that leads to the most
adversarially perturbed label. The idea is that we want to
keep the probability of the groundtruth class (i.e., y′c) at
least β times larger than the maximal probability over non-
groundtruth classes (i.e., y′LL). Mathematically, we want
y′c ≥ β ·max
k 6=c
y′k. (16)
Solving for the following equation
1− y ≥ βy
n− 1 ·
vLL − vMC + γ∑
k 6=c vk
n−1 − vMC + γ
, (17)
we obtain
y ≤ 1
1 + βn−1
vLL−vMC+γ∑
k 6=c vk
n−1 −vMC+γ
. (18)
Next we consider two extreme cases.
1) The probabilities of non-groundtruth classes are
evenly distributed, i.e., label smoothing. In this case, vLL =
vMC . Then we have
y =
1
1 + βn−1
. (19)
Take CIFAR10 for example (n= 10). We have y=0.1,
β=81, or y=0.5, β=9, or y=0.9, β=1.
2) The probabilities of non-groundtruth classes are cen-
tered on one class. In this case, vLL =
∑
k 6=cvk, vMC = 0.
Then we have
y =
1
1 + β vLL+γvLL+(n−1)γ
≈ 1
1 + β
. (20)
Note that γ is usually very small, e.g. γ=0.01.
We can see that given the multiplier β, the range of per-
turbation budget y is
y ∈ ( 1
1 + β
,
1
1 + βn−1
]. (21)
Note that we only need to specify a proper β. As a special
case, β =∞ corresponds to the original one-hot label.
4.2. Generating Adversarial Images
Next we study how to compute the adversarial image x′
given the original data point x, y. Mathematically, we need
to solve the problem
max
x′∈Sx
L(x′, y; θ). (22)
This is the adversarial attack problem. For non-targeted at-
tacks, we directly maximize (22). The downside of using
non-targeted attacks is label leaking [29]. This is because
during training the model implicitly learns to infer the true
label from the adversarial perturbation (gradient). In other
words, the model smartly finds a shortcut (degenerate min-
imum [52]) towards the local optima. A more general and
severe problem is gradient masking [41]. It refers to the
fact that the loss surface of the model is very jagged, and
so it becomes harder for the attackers to find good gradient
during the iterative attack. As demonstrated in [1], gradient
masking (a.k.a. gradient obfuscation) gives a false sense of
robustness, and the model gets broken in the face of strong
attacks with large number of iterations.
Recently, two techniques were proposed to reduce or
avoid gradient masking problem: 1) using multi-step
PGD [34]; 2) using an ensemble of models to generate ad-
versarial examples [52]. However, the effectiveness comes
with expensive time cost [34] or memory cost [52]. Since
one of our design consideration is speed, in this paper,
we focus on two simple techniques: 1) using targeted at-
tack [29]; 2) adding random noise as in Eq. (3) [52, 34].
As for targeted attack, in [29], the authors used the Least
Likely (LL) class as the targeted class, i.e.,
y′ = argmaxyˆ 6=yL(x, yˆ; θ). (23)
Differently, here in this paper, we use the Most Confusing
(MC) class as the targeted class, i.e.,
y′ = argminyˆ 6=yL(x, yˆ; θ). (24)
In order for fast training, we use one-step PGD (in the
experiment on the difficult ImageNet we use two-step).
Note that the update equations (3) and (4) are for non-
targeted attacks. For targeted attacks, we simply replace
the groundtruth label y by the targeted label y′, and also re-
place the plus sign by the minus sign, in order to minimize
the loss with respect to the targeted label.
5. Experiments
Dataset and Network. In the experiment, we use CI-
FAR10 [27], and SVHN [39] and the large-scale Ima-
geNet [13]. We do not use MNIST [30] because it is
not a good testbed due to the near-binary nature of the
images [52]. For CIFAR10 and SVHN, we use Wide
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ResNet [57] (WRN-28-10). For ImageNet, we use ResNet
family [21]. Most of the diagnostic experiments are con-
ducted on CIFAR10, because it is currently the most com-
monly used dataset for adversarial training.
Evaluation. Based on the amount of knowledge that at-
tackers have, there are several types of attacks: i) Gradient-
based (white-box), where the attackers have full knowledge
of the model (structure, parameters); ii) Score(logit)-based,
where the attackers know the score/logit vector of the model
(e.g. SPSA [53], ZOO [10]); iii) Decision-based, where the
attackers only know the predicted class (e.g. boundary at-
tack [5]). Note that the more information the attackers have,
the stronger the adversarial attacks will be. In the experi-
ment we use the strongest gradient-based white-box attacks.
For CIFAR10 and SVHN, we follow the evaluation setup
in [34]. Specifically, the test perturbation budget is 8 pix-
els. In order to use strong attacks to evaluate the model ro-
bustness, we 1) always use non-targeted attack, and 2) drop
random start for one-step PGD attack (i.e. FGSM), and use
random start for multi-step PGD attack. Also, for one-step
attack, the step size is the perturbation budget (i.e., 8 pix-
els), and for multi-step attack, the step size is 2 pixels.
For ImageNet, we follow the evaluation setup in [26, 56].
Specifically, the test perturbation budget is 16 pixels. We
use the non-targeted attack, and the targeted attack where
the label is randomly selected. The step size is 1 pixel, ex-
pect for PGD10 attack where the step size is 1.6 pixel.
Implementation Details. For CIFAR10 and SVHN, we
largely follow the released code in [34]. The learning rate
schedule is [0.1, 0.01, 0.001] for CIFAR and [0.01, 0.001,
0.0001] for SVHN. For the short training, the decay epoch
schedule is [60, 90, 100]. And for the long training, the
epoch schedule [100, 150, 200]. In all the tables, the mod-
els of long training are postfixed by “+”. For ImageNet,
we use the Tensorpack package and perform distributed ad-
versarial training with 8 GPUs. We largely follow the code
for distributed training ResNet models on ImageNet. The
learning rate schedule is [0.1, 0.01, 0.001, 0.0001], and the
decay epoch schedule is [30, 60, 90, 100]. For ResNet50,
the training takes about 2 days on a DGX machine. We plan
to release the code and models after this work is published.
5.1. Random Start and MC Targeted Attack
In this subsection, we demonstrate that for one-step ad-
versarial training, random start and MC targeted attack are
effective at preventing label leaking and gradient masking
problem. This diagnostic experiment is conducted on CI-
FAR10. To this end, we evaluate three different ways of
generating adversarial examples during training: FGSM at-
tack, LL targeted attack, and MC targeted attack. For each
option, we perform one-step adversarial training with or
without random start. This leads to six adversarially trained
Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE7 blackw.o. RS RS w.o. RS RS
FGSM 55.2 99.1 68.6 0.0 0.0 56.2
R-FGSM 89.8 55.8 63.6 46.4 48.0 88.0
LL 92.6 97.9 86.2 0.0 0.0 80.9
R-LL 91.4 46.6 56.6 34.1 36.0 88.2
MC 86.4 70.7 73.0 37.6 40.3 84.3
R-MC 89.9 62.6 70.2 46.8 48.4 87.1
Table 3: The classification accuracy of one-step adversarially
trained models, using different attacks, and, with or without ran-
dom start. The models trained using random start are prefixed with
“R-”. We see that random start and MC targeted attack are effec-
tive at preventing label leaking and gradient masking problem.
Acc.(%) FGSM MC LLw.o. RS RS w.o. RS RS w.o. RS RS
R-FGSM 55.8 63.6 55.4 63.6 75.5 79.8
R-LL 46.6 56.6 44.0 55.6 70.7 76.4
R-MC 62.6 70.2 63.9 71.3 80.1 83.8
Table 4: The classification accuracy of three attacks, i.e., FGSM
attack, LL targeted attack and MC targeted attack, with or with-
out random start. The rows correspond to different adversari-
ally trained models. We see that MC targeted attack has similar
strength as FGSM attack, and both are much stronger than LL tar-
geted attack.
models in total. The perturbation budget is 8 pixels in train-
ing. The results are shown in Table 3. The rows correspond
to different models, where the prefix “R” means that ran-
dom start is used. The columns correspond to non-targeted
attacks using one-step (FGSM) or 7-step (CE7, CE is short
for Cross-Entropy), with or without random start (denoted
by “RS”). The last column corresponds to the black-box
attack using the undefended model and FGSM attack (w.o.
RS). Firstly we see that the target models trained by FGSM
and LL suffer badly from the label leaking problem because
the accuracy against FGSM attack is even higher than the
clean accuracy. But this is just false robustness and the ac-
curacy drops to zero under CE7 attacks. Next, after apply-
ing random start, R-FGSM and R-LL become quite robust,
demonstrating random start helps the model avoid the label
leaking problem during adversarial training. Lastly, we see
that the model R-MC performs the best, while R-LL per-
forms the worst, against FGSM and CE7 attacks.
We hypothesize that the adversarially trained mode by
one-step LL targeted attack is weak, because the LL tar-
geted attack is weak by itself. Table 4 shows the strength
of these three attacks using one-step PGD. The rows corre-
spond to different models trained using random start. The
columns correspond to three attacks with or without random
start. We see that MC targeted attack is roughly as strong as
FGSM attack, and both of them are much stronger than LL
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Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE7 CE20
R-FGSM 89.8 55.8 48.0 42.9
R-FGSM-LS (y = 0.5) 89.1 62.0 54.6 49.0
R-MC 89.9 62.6 48.4 43.4
R-MC-LS (y = 0.5) 91.1 70.6 59.2 53.3
R-MC-LS+ (y = 0.5) 91.8 71.4 62.7 55.9
R-MC-LA (β = 9) 90.7 69.6 59.9 55.3
R-MC-LA+ (β = 9) 91.2 70.7 63.0 57.8
Madry [34] 87.3 56.1 50.0 45.8
Madry* 88.0 57.0 51.2 47.6
Madry-LA 86.8 63.4 57.8 53.2
Madry-LA+ 87.5 65.9 61.3 57.5
Table 5: The classification accuracy of R-MC-LA models and
variants under various white-box attacks on CIFAR10.
targeted attack. This is probably because it is usually hard to
slightly manipulate the original image so that it becomes a
visually very different class. Therefore, we argue for using
MC targeted attack during adversarial training because 1) it
is much stronger that LL targeted attack; 2) FGSM attack
risks label leaking and gradient masking problem.
We briefly summarize the role of random start. In train-
ing, it effectively prevents the label leaking and gradient
masking problem, but in attack, it weakens the strength for
one-step PGD attack (shown in Table 4). As we will show
later, random start has very little effect for multi-step PGD
attack, especially when the number of steps becomes large.
5.2. CIFAR10 Dataset
In this subsection, we report results against white-box
attacks on CIFAR10 [27] dataset. It has 10 classes, 50K
training images (5K per class) and 10K test images. As
summarized above, to generate adversarial images, we use
random start and MC targeted attack (the perturbation bud-
get is 8 pixels). To generate adversarial labels, we use (18)
to compute the budget y and (14) to compute the adversar-
ially perturbed labels y′. The resulting model is denoted as
R-MC-LA where LA stands for label adversary. We also ex-
periment with label smoothing (LS for short), a special case
of adversarial label, and denote this model by R-MC-LS.
Our baseline is the mult-step adversarial training method
by [34]. We report the original numbers in their paper, de-
noted by Madry, and also report the numbers by our repro-
duced model, denoted by Madry*. The accuracy against
various steps of PGD attacks is given in Table 5. We see that
perturbing labels during training significantly improves the
robustness over the baseline. Label smoothing (R-MC-LS)
works pretty well, and label adversary (R-MC-LA) is even
better. Besides, we also apply label adversary to the multi-
step adversarial training. We see that the resulting mod-
els, denoted by Madry-LA and Madry-LA+, significantly
improves the original version, further verifying the effec-
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Figure 1: The classification accuracy of the proposed R-MC-LA
models against white-box PGD attacks of different number of it-
erations on CIFAR10. The models are trained by using different
perturbation budget. We use β = 9.
Acc.(%) clean CE20 CW20 CE100 CW100 CW200
R-MC-LA (x = 8) 90.8 54.6 53.7 52.9 51.9 51.7
R-MC-LA+ (x = 8) 91.0 57.5 56.2 55.2 53.8 53.6
R-MC-LA (x = 4) 93.0 63.1 61.5 60.1 58.0 57.6
R-MC-LA+ (x = 4) 92.9 66.9 64.2 63.7 60.7 60.3
Madry* 88.0 47.6 48.6 47.2 48.1 48.1
Table 6: The classification accuracy of the proposed R-MC-LA
models under various white-box attacks on CIFAR10. To rule
out randomness, the numbers are averaged over 3 independently
trained models. We use β = 9.
tiveness of label adversary. Interestingly, R-MC-LA(+) per-
forms even better than Madry-LA(+). Lastly, we observe
that longer training is helpful to all models.
5.2.1 Different Perturbation Budgets during Training
Next we study whether using larger perturbation budget
during training leads to more robust models. We train mod-
els using the budget x∈{1, 2, 4, 8, 12} pixels during train-
ing, and we use 8 pixels for evaluation. Figure 1 shows the
classification accuracy with respect to the number of steps
in PGD attack. Firstly we observe the general trend that as
the number of steps increases, the accuracy drops quickly
and then plateaus. Secondly, we find that big budget (i.e.,
x = 12) or small budget (i.e., x = 1) lead to less robust
models. Interestingly, we see that the model trained using
x= 4 achieves the best robustness. The exact numbers are
given in Table 6. Note that to rule out randomness, the num-
bers are averaged over 3 independently trained models. We
also test the attacks using the margin-based CW loss [7].
For example, CW200 attack means using CW loss and 200
steps PGD. We notice that 1) the baseline model [34] per-
forms similarly against either (cross-entropy-based) CE at-
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Acc.(%) clean Undefended another R-MC-LAFGSM CE20 FGSM CE20
R-MC-LA 90.7 87.8 88.8 74.4 71.0
R-MC-LA+ 91.2 88.5 89.9 74.6 74.4
Table 7: The classification accuracy of R-MC-LA models
against black-box attacks on CIFAR10. We use β = 9.
Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE20 CE100 CW100
R-MC-LA (x = 8) 94.1 66.9 46.7 42.0 40.9
R-MC-LA+ (x = 8) 94.1 69.8 53.9 50.3 48.9
R-MC-LA (x = 4) 95.7 72.6 54.4 47.2 45.7
R-MC-LA+ (x = 4) 95.5 74.2 63.0 59.1 58.5
Madry* 91.8 61.0 43.2 42.1 43.4
Table 8: The classification accuracy of R-MC-LA models
under various white-box attacks on SVHN. The models are
trained using different perturbation budget. We use β=9.
tack or (margin-based) CW attack; 2) CW attack is more
effective than CE attack when attacking our models (R-MC-
LA). Furthermore, we evaluate our best model, R-MC-LA+
(x = 4), against 1000-step PGD attacks using CE loss and
CW loss. The accuracy is 61.4% for CE and 59.3% for CW,
which is very close to that against 200-step PGD attack.
5.2.2 Black-box Attack Evaluation
We next evaluate our R-MC-LA models against black-box
attacks. We use two models to generate the adversarial ex-
amples: the undefended model and another randomly ini-
tialized R-MC-LA model. All the models are trained using
x = 8. The results are shown in Table 7. We see that at-
tacks generated by R-MC-LA model are stronger than those
by undefended model, because two independently trained
R-MC-LA models share inherent structure. Besides, we see
that all the black-box attacks are weaker than white-box at-
tacks (by comparing the accuracy), demonstrating that our
models do not suffer from the gradient masking problem.
5.3. SVHN Dataset
The SVHN [39] is a 10-way house number classifica-
tion dataset. It contains 73257 training images, and 26032
test images. We don’t use the additional training images.
The results against white-box attacks are shown in Table 8.
Similar to CIFAR10, we see that our models significantly
outperform the state-of-the-art results on clean images and
against PGD attacks of various strength.
5.4. ImageNet Dataset
The ImageNet dataset has 1.28 million training images
with 1000 classes. We use the validation set with 50K im-
ages for evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, up to
Acc.(%) clean CE10-nt CE100-nt CE10-rd CE100-rd
R-MC-LA-R50 58.9 14.9 4.0 45.8 24.5
R-MC-LA-R101 61.9 18.0 6.3 45.8 26.0
R-MC-LA-R152 63.9 19.8 7.4 46.5 26.6
[26]-IncepV3 72.0 NA NA 27.9 NA
[56]-R152 62.3 17.1 7.3 52.5 41.7
Table 9: The classification accuracy of R-MC-LA models
under various white-box attacks on ImageNet. We use β=
100. The budget is 16 pixels in training and evaluation.
now, there are only two papers that have applied multi-step
adversarial training on ImageNet, because it is very com-
putationally expensive. Specifically, the prior art [26] used
53 P100 GPUs and the recent paper [56] used 128 V100
GPUs. We train our models on a DGX machine with only
8 GPUs and it takes us about 2 days. For fair comparison,
we use 16 pixels as test perturbation budget. In our experi-
ment, we find that, using one-step attack during training (in
this case step size is 16 pixels) suffers severely from label
leaking and gradient masking. We also observe the similar
problem on CIFAR10 and SVHN, when training with large
budgets, e.g., 12 or 16. In order to make our method work
for the 16-pixel evaluation setup, we use two-step MC tar-
geted attack (in this case the step size become 8 pixels). In
the experiment, we find that training without label adver-
sary performs very bad, further demonstrating the effective-
ness of label adversary. In evaluation, we use both the non-
targeted attack and the targeted attack where the target label
is uniformly randomly selected. Note that the non-targeted
attack is much stronger than the randomly targeted attack,
so we believe using both will lead to a more reliable robust-
ness evaluation. Table 9 shows the top-1 accuracy of our
method and two baseline methods, where the non-targeted
attack is denoted by “nt”, and the randomly targeted attack
is denoted by “rd”. We can see that our methods signifi-
cantly outperform the prior art [26] against CE10-rd attack.
Compared with the recent work [56], our models are better
on clean accuracy and against non-targeted attacks, but are
worse against randomly targeted attacks. We hypothesize
that this may be because that the models in [56] are trained
using randomly targeted attack (same as test), and, they are
using an-order-of-magnitude more computational resources
(30-step PGD during adversarial training).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed to use the adversarial image
and the adversarial label during adversarial training. The
adversarial image was generated by one-step or two-step
MC targeted attack. The adversarial label was computed
by an close-form formula. Comprehensive experiments on
CIFAR10, SVHN and ImageNet, against various white-box
attacks, demonstrate the effectiveness of our method.
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Appendix
A. Introduction
First, we provide two more experiments on CIFAR10.
Then, we provide the results on CIFAR100 dataset. Next, to
validate our motivation, we compare the gradient magnitude
of different models. At last, we provide another heuristic
solution to the problem of generating adversarial labels.
B. Two More Experiments on CIFAR10
Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE1000 MI Ori-CW DF-l2
R-MC-LA+ 92.8 75.6 61.4 65.5 65.4 / 88.2 77.8
TRADES 84.9 61.1 56.4 58.0 81.2 81.6
Table 10: The classification accuracy against various white-
box attacks on CIFAR10. We use training budget x = 4.
B.1. Against Other White-box Attacks
Table 10 shows the accuracy against other white-box
attacks. We compare with the winner, TRADES [58],
in NeurIPS18 Adversarial Vision Challenge. We use the
default settings in the Cleverhands package to generate
the attacks. “MI” refers to the MI-FGSM method [15].
“Ori-CW” refers to the original CW attack [7], and
the two numbers refer to two common sets of hyper-
parameters: {const=100, confid=0, lr=1e-1, max iter=1e2}
/ {const=100, confid=0, lr=1e-2, max iter=1e3}. “DF-l2”
refers to the DeepFool attack with l2-norm [38]. We see
that our models generally outperform the baseline, except
against the DeepFool attack. We note that our network is
smaller, and our training method is an-order-of-magnitude
faster2.
B.2. Effect of Number of Training Images
We vary the number of training images per class. The re-
sults are shown in Table 11. This is aligned with the claim
in [47] that adversarial training requires more data than reg-
ular training.
Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE20 CE100 CW100
R-MC-LA (5K) 90.7 69.6 55.3 53.8 52.8
R-MC-LA (2K) 85.6 56.1 42.8 41.1 40.2
R-MC-LA (0.5K) 73.3 33.7 25.1 24.5 24.0
Table 11: The classification accuracy of R-MC-LA models,
trained using different data size on CIFAR10. The number
in the parenthesis means the number of images per class.
We use x = 8, β = 9.
2 [58] uses WRN-34, and 20-step PGD attack during training.
Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE20 CE100 CW100
R-MC-LA (x = 8) 68.7 30.5 23.2 22.7 20.6
R-MC-LA+ (x = 8) 66.2 31.3 23.1 22.4 20.0
R-MC-LA9 (x = 8) 68.7 33.7 23.1 22.0 20.1
R-MC-LA9+ (x = 8) 68.2 36.9 26.7 25.3 22.1
Madry* 61.9 28.8 23.7 23.4 24.5
Table 12: The classification accuracy of R-MC-LA models
against white-box attacks on CIFAR100. The models are
trained using different perturbation budget. We use β = 11.
C. CIFAR100 Dataset
In this section we report the results against white-box at-
tacks on CIFAR100 [27] dataset. It has 100 classes, 50K
training images and 10K test images. In addition to the ba-
sic R-MC-LA models, we also try a slightly modified ver-
sion, denoted by R-MC-LA9. Specifically, when generat-
ing the adversarial label, we distribute the y to the top-9
non-groundtruth classes with largest loss, instead of to all
the non-groundtruth classes. This modification brings sev-
eral percentage gain. The results are shown in Table 12.
We see that our models outperform the state-of-the-art on
clean image and against FGSM, and perform comparably on
multi-step attacks. We hypothesize that CIFAR100 is more
difficult than CIFAR10 and SVHN for adversarial training
because of much fewer images per class.
D. Gradient Magnitude
Table 13 provides the gradient magnitude results on three
datase. For CIFAR10 and SVHN, madry’s method is trained
using PGD7-2 with budget 8 pixels. For ImageNet, madry’s
method is trained using PGD10-3 with budget 16 pixels.
From the table, we see that adversarially trained models,
including madry’s and ours, leads to much smaller gradi-
ent magnitude (one or two order-of-magnitude), compared
to undefended models. This correlates with our hypothe-
sis that there may be a link between small gradient mag-
nitude and adversarial robustness. Besides, we see that
madry’s and ours are comparable (particularly on CIFAR10
and SVHN). Note that although gradient magnitude con-
fidently distinguish undefended and adversarially trained
models, it is not a precise indicator of robustness between
adversrially trained models. Currently, only from the gra-
dient magnitude, we cannot confidently tell which one is
more robust. So we have to compare and report their accu-
racy. Finding precise indicator for adversarial robustness is
an active and unsolved research topic.
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CIFAR10 SVHN ImageNet
undefended madry ours undefended madry ours undefended madry ours
max 349.9 1.8 1.6 267.9 15.3 3.4 0.48 0.004 0.084
mean 2.3 0.022 0.0098 0.77 0.12 0.022 0.0044 0.000038 0.00014
Table 13: Comparison of gradient magnitude, ‖∇xL(x, y; θ)‖22, of undefended model, madry’s model, and our model, on three datasets
(averaged over all test / validation images). The gradient is taken w.r.t. the original image range [0, 255], instead of [-1, 1], so the numbers
are 127.5 times smaller than Table 2 in the paper. For CIFAR10 and SVHN, all models are run three times to average out randomness.
E. Another Solution to Generating Adversarial
Labels
In this section, we provide another heuristic solution to
the problem of generating adversarial labels
max
‖y′−y‖∞≤y
L(x, y′; θ). (25)
Here the original groundtruth y is a one-hot vector, i.e.,
yc = 1 and yk = 0, k 6= c.
In the main paper, the heuristic is to distribute the y to
non-groundtruth classes while keeping the share of the MC
class very small. Specifically, the share is proportional to
the gradient of each class subtracted by the minimal gradi-
ent (which corresponds to the MC class). Here, we propose
another simpler heuristic, which is that the share is directly
proportional to the respective gradient. We can then easily
obtain the formula
y′k =
yvk∑
k 6=c vk
, k 6= c. (26)
Note that we use vk to denote ∇ykL(x, y; θ) for short. By
using the following condition
yc ≥ βmax
k 6=c
yk′ , (27)
we can solve for the largest budget y
y ≤ 1
1 + βvmax∑
k 6=c vk
. (28)
Note that this solution is an exact application of gradient
ascent
y′k = yk + α∇ykL(x, y; θ), k 6= c, (29)
where
α =
1∑
k 6=c vk + βvmax
. (30)
We favor the solution used in the main paper over this
solution (26) for two reasons. Firstly, from the optimiza-
tion point of view, the solution in the main paper leads to
a higher (better) objective value for the maximization prob-
lem (25), because it distributes more shares to the classes
with larger gradient. Secondly, the solution in the main pa-
per leads to a smaller y′MC (proof given below). Note that
Acc.(%) clean FGSM CE20 CE100 CW100
R-MC-LA (main) 90.8 69.3 54.6 52.9 51.9
R-MC-LA+ (main) 91.0 70.3 57.5 55.2 53.8
R-MC-LA (sup) 90.2 70.9 53.2 51.1 49.9
R-MC-LA+ (sup) 91.5 71.4 57.2 54.1 51.5
Table 14: The classification accuracy of the proposed R-
MC-LA models under various white-box attacks on CI-
FAR10. The source models are trained using two solutions
for generating the adversarial labels. We use β = 9 and
x = 8 during training and in evaluation.
the adversarial image used in training is generated by the
MC targeted attack. Using a smaller y′MC will suppress
the network to predict large probability on the MC class,
thus better focusing on predicting large probability on the
groundtruth class. The results achieved by these two solu-
tions are shown in Table 14, where “main” refers to using
the solution in the main paper, and “sup” refers to using the
solution (26) in the supplementary material. We can see that
“main” is slightly better than “sup” against multi-step PGD
attacks.
Lastly we provide the proof. From the solution in the
main paper, we have
y′MC,main =
γ∑
k 6=c vk − (n− 1)(vMC − γ) + β(vLL − vMC + γ)
.
(31)
From the solution (26), we have
y′MC,sup =
vMC∑
k 6=c vk + βvLL
. (32)
The sufficient and necessary condition of
y′MC,main < y
′
MC,sup (33)
is
(n− 1)vMC + βvMC <
∑
k 6=c
vk + βvLL, (34)
which is obviously true. This is because the left is smaller
than the right on both the first term and the second term
respectively.
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